Studies of Particular Topics C. The akratic person has not only this defect, but has the further flaw that he gives in to feeling rather than reason more often than the average person. This type of friendship is stable and is not easily broken, since the basis of the friendshipa shared desire for what is genuinely goodis a perfectly stable one. Why does he not address those who have serious doubts about the value of these traditional qualities, and who therefore have not yet decided to cultivate and embrace them? Because most people wish to be liked more than to like, most people like flatterers, who are friends in an inferior position. However, the price of this solution to the problem of fungibility, as it arises both for friendship and for love, is the worry about autonomy raised towards the end of Section 1. But in the real world, friendship is subject to all sorts of pressures. It is this second thesis that is most likely to be found objectionable.
. But it is in its purest form that one really begins to understand what friendship is, a shared vision of the good sunaisthesis. This is surely objectionable as an understanding of friendship. He is vindicating his conception of happiness as virtuous activity by showing how satisfying are the relationships that a virtuous person can normally expect to have. To be fungible is to be replaceable by a relevantly similar object without any loss of value.
However, this raises the question of why we allow any such direction and interpretation. This comment has been removed by a blog administrator. Do true friends have to agree about morality and religion? I´ll be checking out your updates as soon as possible. It is not enough to say that it is what happens when we are in good condition and are active in unimpeded circumstances; one must add to that point the further idea that pleasure plays a certain role in complementing something other than itself. The friendship built between the barber and person getting their haircut will likely dissolve, as it is cheaper to use the services of the cheaper barber.
Aristotle believes that there are three different kinds of friendship; that of utility, friendship of pleasure, and virtuous friendship. One way to construe the question of the value of friendship is in terms of the individual considering whether to be or continue to be engaged in a friendship: why should I invest considerable time, energy, and resources in a friend rather than in myself? Lynch 2005 provides further criticisms of the mirroring view, arguing that the differences between friends can be central and important to their friendship. All of this helps us better understand what it would mean for true friendship to exist in a marriage. This project unfolds in the course of an astonishingly complex account of friendship: not only does Aristotle discuss friendships based on virtuous character, he also describes relationships based on utility or pleasure as defective, but nevertheless genuine, friendships. The three good forms of government in order from best to least good are kingship, aristocracy and timocracy or democracy , and the three deviations are, respectively, tyranny, oligarchy and mob rule. The first two kinds of friendship are only accidental, because in these cases friends are motivated by their own utility and pleasure, not by anything essential to the nature of the friend. Friendship no longer carries significant philosophical importance to us because we live in a world where individualism predominates.
These conclusions that we must turn to broader issues if we are to settle the place friendship has in morality reveal that in one sense the friendship critique has failed: it has not succeeded in making an end run around traditional debates between consequentialists, deontologists, and virtue theorists. Is this passion something that must be felt by every human being at appropriate times and to the right degree? This comment has been removed by a blog administrator. There are three good regimes, kingship, aristocracy, and timocracy. They agree about the value of pleasure, defend a theory about its nature, and oppose competing theories. This sort of man is rare; and indeed all excellent things are rare; and nothing in the world is so hard to find as a thing entirely and completely perfect of its kind. When reason remains unimpaired and unclouded, its dictates will carry us all the way to action, so long as we are able to act. One can show, as a general point, that happiness consists in exercising some skills or other, but that the moral skills of a virtuous person are what one needs is not a proposition that can be established on the basis of argument.
The true mark of friendship, though, is that it consists more of loving than of being loved. Aristotle, however, quickly dismisses this type. But it can be hard to know what that sort of love consists of, let alone how to find it. The kinds of friendship that exists among those in the association corresponds to the type of association. Reprinted in Segvic 2009b: 89—110 ch. The only genuine, friendship, however, is the friendship of good men, which is based on virtue.
The strong form of egoism we have been discussing cannot accept Aristotle's doctrine of the priority of the city to the individual. Good men neither err nor allow their friends to err. In aristocracy the friendship is by virtue of a relationship of superiority based on merit, and in timocracy there is friendship based on equality. Taking pleasure in an activity does help us improve at it, but enjoyment does not cease when perfection is achieved—on the contrary, that is when pleasure is at its peak. For it is only near the end of Book X that he presents a full discussion of the relative merits of these two kinds of intellectual virtue, and comments on the different degrees to which each needs to be provided with resources. While Aristotle leaves room for the idea that relationships based on advantage alone or pleasure alone can give rise to friendships, he believes that such relationships have a smaller claim to be called friendships than those that are based partly or wholly on virtue. This comment has been removed by a blog administrator.
Aristotle should therefore be acquitted of an accusation made against him by J. You tell me if I you are interested and I´ll drop a few lines for you. Young people quickly become friends and quickly cease to be friends because what pleasures them changes constantly. It follows from this conception of pleasure that every instance of pleasure must be good to some extent. The well-regulated market frees the classic Aristolelian friendship of virtue from friendship of utility. Intellectual Virtues Since Aristotle often calls attention to the imprecision of ethical theory see e. According to Aristotle there are three types of friendships.
Even if one lived in a city populated entirely by perfectly virtuous citizens, the number with whom one could carry on a friendship of the perfect type would be at most a handful. He treats this as an easily understood phenomenon, and has no doubts about its existence. There are two interlocking reasons, according to Pangle, why Aristotle thinks equalization via the greater affection of the inferior cannot genuinely equalize an unequal friendship. This is not the only way of reading the Ethics, however. On the contrary, his defense of self-love makes it clear that he is not willing to defend the bare idea that one ought to love oneself alone or above others; he defends self-love only when this emotion is tied to the correct theory of where one's good lies, for it is only in this way that he can show that self-love need not be a destructive passion. This comment has been removed by a blog administrator. Despite the extravagant praise that he lavishes upon friendship, Aristotle is quite clear that the best and happiest life is not the life spent in friendship, but the life spent in the contemplation of those things that are most true and therefore most beautiful and most dependable.